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3 Foreign Policy is defined here as the interaction of the state with other actors of the Inter-
national System in three main scopes: political-diplomatic, military-strategic and economic 
(Oliveira 2005, 7-14). There is an important debate in the International Relations literature, 
and particularly among the authors of the research program on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
regarding the definition of which indicators and actors should be taken in to account in the 
analysis of capabilities, intentions and the process of formulation and implementation of a 
country's Foreign Policy. The works ofHudson and Vare (1995), Putnam (1988), Smith, Had-
field and Dunne (2012), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Salomón and Pinheiro (2013), Pinheiro 
(2ooo), Sennes (zoo3), Cervo (2oo8), Figueira (zen), arnong others, are examples of such 
attempts of systematization. Among the indicators utilized, a relative unanimity can be con-
sidered regarding the central role of the economic, military and political-diplomatic aspects as 
fundamental to the countries' international insertion Grand Strategy. 
4 Even though there are divergences in the literature, the concepts of security and defense are 
treated here as analogues: it is about the preservation ofBrazil's sovereignty in the Intemation-
al System through the use or threat of use of force (dissuasion). Ergo, in this work Serurity and 
Defense Policies relate to the area of Strategy and of the Grand Strategy, in other words, relate 
to the use of force by the state towards politically determined objectives (Diniz, Proença and 
Raza 1999). 
5 From the works ofFonseca (2.015), Bresser-Pereira (2oo6), Herrlein Jr. (2014) and Coronel, 
Azevedo and Campos (2014), it can be affirmed that the Development Strategy or Moclel relates 
to a political project of overcoming underdevelopment by seeking technological moderniza-
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tive (I030-20I7)- In this sense, the research used an approach based on the 
works ofCervo (2oio), Sennes (2003), Silva (2oio) and Oliveira M.F. (2005) 
that seek to analyze the characteristics of the phases of the Brazilian Foreign 
Policy (BFP) that cross the limits of the presidential mandates, being also 
linked to the political, economic and military constraints of the Intemational 
System. From its permanent objectives- sovereignty, citizenship and region-
al integration -, the frameworks for intemational insertion were outlined, as 
well as the ways in which the Brazilian state sought to connect the three areas 
ofits Grand Strategy6. 
The justification for this work can be summarized in two scopes: (I) 
academic and (2) political-social. In academic terms, the research seeks to 
fi11 a gap between two research programs in Brazil: (I) the study of the re-
lations between the Foreign Policy and the Defense Policy, and ( 2) the area 
of Defense Economics. In the first case, the researchers seek to identify the 
interactions between, in the words ofRaymond Aron (2002), "the soldier and 
the diplomat", leaving in the background the needs of the Defense Industri-
al Base (DIB), of the productive sphere and technological modemization, or 
even adopting an exclusively institutional, cultural, and intemally organiza-
tional approach. On the other hand, the proponents of Defense Economics 
look away from the political and International Relations sphere, in the words 
ofSandler and Hartley (2007), seeking to "apply the instruments of econom-
ics in the study of defense", particularly in the area ofthe economic globaliza-
tion. This work is an attempt to articulate these three areas of Brazil's Grand 
Strategy - Politics, Economy and Security - aiming to underline its impor-
tance in the execution of the national project, the regional integration, the ex-
tra-regional partnerships and the Intemational Technical Cooperation (ITC)'. 
The political-social justification is the increase of intemational po-
tion, the increase of the industrial productive capabilities and those of economic support to the 
country's foreign and defense policies in the International System. 
6 According to the Brazilian Armed Forces Glossary, Strategy means the "art to prepare and 
apply power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all order". Grand 
Strategy, on the other hand, is similar to what is called •National Strategy~, that defines the 
synergy of the Military Strategy with the other areas of the National Power: "Art of preparing 
and applying the National Power to, overcoming the obstacles, reach and preserve the national 
objectives, according to the orientation established by the National Politics~ (Brasil2007}. 
7 From the systematization of the debate about the concept realized by Silva and Martins 
(204}, it can be affirmed that International Technical Cooperation (ITC} is characterized by 
the exchange ofknowledge and management in arder to increase the technological capacities 
of institutions and people and is closely related to the generation of development and to the 
increase of state capacities. 
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litical, economic and military competition8, that demands from the Brazil-
ian state the formulation of a Grand Strategy that articulates these planning 
spheres. Internally, the economic stagnation is added to the uncertainties re-
garding the country's political institutions. Externally, Brazil's new defense 
documents, sent to the congress in the beginning of 2017, reflect the retrac-
tion of the Brazilian foreign policy, even though they maintain some of the 
characteristics of its predecessors, such as the prioritization of the strategic 
surroundings (South America and South Atlantic) (Brazil 2017). Besides, 
there is a gap regarding the economic development project, formerly guided 
by the revitalization ofthe country's DIB. 
After the historical analysis, the article concludes that the Brazilian 
state reacted systematically to the political, economic and military changes of 
the Intemational System and sought to achieve a synergy between the For-
eign Policy, the Defense Policy and the Development Strategy. The Develop-
mental State (as of 1930) and the diplomatic bargaining sought to enthrone 
the Center of Economic Decision9 of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, through 
the creation of national companies, the substitution ofimports and the search 
for a relative autonomy of a Brazilian military-industrial complex, sought to 
benefit from intemational strategic partnerships. Tiris process had continuity 
in the govemment of Juscelino Kubitschek, and also in the military govem-
ments of the years rg6o to rg8o. Driven by the I and 11 PND, the Brazilian 
D IB began to appear as an exporter o f military equipment. 
After the economic crisis of the rg8os, the advent of the Liberal State 
retracted investments in the national DIB, prioritizing the fight against in-
flation, economic and financiai opening and adherence to intemational re-
gimes. The strategic projects were paralyzed, giving priority to purchases of 
8 Such a scenario is exemplified by large interregional economic agreements such as the 
Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlatinc Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
the Asian lnvestment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP). Donald Trump's election in the United States of America expresses 
a reaction to the economic and military rise of regional power poles such as Russia and China, 
which have gradually acquired extra-regional capacity. lhe contradictory actions of the North 
American country in Asia and the Middle East demonstra te the framework of an International 
System, although asymmetrical, multipolar. 
9 The concept of •decision center" is central to Celso Furtado's work: it means the ability of a 
country, through the mastery of core technologies at a certain stage of capitalist development, 
to make choices in terrns of development, foreign policy and security (Oliveira L. K. 2012). Ar.-
cording to Furtado (1962), the Brazilian industrialization that began in the 1930s had the effect 
of •transferring to the national territory the main center of decisions related to the country's 
economic life" (Furtado, 1962). In the first half of the twentieth century, the conquest of the 
center of economic decision had as a prerequisite the domination of the steel industry and the 
petroleum industry (Furtado 1962). 
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war material. From the late 1990s and early 2ooos, in the wake of the re-
forrns of the Brazilian Public Administrationzo, the Logistics State, once again 
sought to acquire productive and military capabilities from the 3rd Industrial 
Revolution". It can be said that the Logistics State sought to synthesize the 
demands of autonomy (Developmentalist State) and modernization (Liber-
al State) by attracting infrastructure companies for the defense industry and 
forrning South-South, South-East and South-North partnership, later guid-
ed by the National Defense Strategy (NOS 2oo8) and the National Defense 
White Paper (2012). The crisis ofthis model occurred from 2013, already in 
the Govemment of Dilma Rousseff, and was consolidated in 2015, with the 
beginning of the process of impeachment and the rise o f Michel Temer to the 
Presidency ofBrazil in 2or6. 
The Developmental State, the 2nd Industrial Revolution and 
the Defense Industrial Base (1930-1985) 
The 2nd Industrial Revolution demanded the creation in Brazil of 
several mechanisms of protection of the nascent industry, of the country's 
mineral resources, tax reforrns anda process of import substitution. The first 
Getulio Vargas govemment (r930-I945) encouraged the import of capital 
goods and the production of final goods instead of importing consumer goods 
and exporting raw materiais (Fonseca 2003). Considering the institutional 
10 Since the 1990s, the Brazilian state has undergone a new process of reform in its Public 
Administration. 1his process is based on the promulgation ofConstitutional Amendrnent No. 
19 (1998), which established the associated management of public services through public 
consortia and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of the Federal 
Constitution). To date, consortia are used by municipalities and states of the federation in the 
area ofhealth and by the Federal Union for security at major events, but can also serve as Fed-
eral Union instrurnents to optimize resources, infrastructu:re, personnel, among others, with 
a view to leverage productive civilian and Inilitary investrnents in partnership with states and 
municipalities. 
11 lhe development of the computer can be seen as the center of the Scientific-Technological 
Revolution (or 3rd Industrial Revolution): in 1970, the American company Intellaunched the 
first microprocessor, and in 1975 IBM inaugurated the IBM 5100, the first personal computer 
produced in large quantities (Conti 2oo6). It is also in the 197os that the Niinitz Class ofSuper 
Aircraft Carriers was created, the nucleus of North American naval power that gathers until 
today all the achievements ofthe 3rd Industrial Revolution. The so-called aerodrome (NAe) syn-
thesizes the accumulation of scientific and technological capabilities in areas that cross space, 
air and sea and from repositories ranging from the propulsion plant to the embedded systems. 
Thus, strategic autonomy has also been linked to the domain of the production of communi-
cation networks (satellites, telecommunications, radiofusion) and computers (seiniconductors 
and superconductors). 
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framework, the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce (1930), the Bra-
zilian Bank's Agricultura! and Industrial Credit Portfolio (1937), the National 
Oil Council (1938), the Plan ofPublic Works and Defense Equipment (1939), 
were created among others. On the educationallevel and the qualification of 
the workforce, Francisco Campos' reform started in 1931, aiming to create 
technical and vocational courses focusing on production-oriented areas such 
as engineering, agronomy and accounting (Fonseca 2003). 
The Developmentalist State aimed to enthrone the Center ofEconom-
ic Decision of the 2nd Industrial Revolution through the creation of national 
companies, import substitution and the quest for autonomy of a Brazilian 
military-industrial complex. Thus, severa! mechanisms were created to pro-
tect the nascent industry, the country's mineral resources and tax reforms. 
As an example, the creation of the National Steel Company (NSC), the Volta 
Redonda Plant (1941) and the Vale do Rio Doce Company in 1942 can be men-
tioned. Not surprisingly, these companies were bom in the context ofWorld 
War II, and were the result ofVargas's and the Brazilian Army's view of the 
need to nationalize strategic national mineral wealth and the manufacture of 
weapons and projectiles that required the production of iron and steel (Fon-
seca 2003). 
This challenge was present throughout the history of Brazil, and was 
explained, forexample, in the 1930s bythe workofGóes Monteiro called "The 
Political Purpose of the Army." Then, the Army General emphasized the pri-
macy of the security and military sovereignty of a country, that is, the "force 
instrument of national sovereignty as the backbone of the national organism" 
(Monteiro 1932). In addition, he a.ffirmed that the Defense Policy has an in-
trinsic relationship with the other spheres of state planning: 
General policy, economic policy, industrial and agricultural policy, the com-
munications system, intemational politics, ali branches of activity, produc-
tion and collective existence, including instruction and education of the 
people, the political-social regime - everything, finally, affects the military 
policy of a country (Monteiro r932). 
In the strategic plan, Góes realized the need to modernize and expand 
productive capacities at the leveis of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on 
steel and oil. lbis is because "the era ofuniversal peace is still a myth for hu-
manity and nations continue to prepare feverishly for the next war" (Monteiro 
1932). The increase of military capabilities would demand of the Brazilian 
state a greater readiness for military mobilization. Hence the importance of 
the defense industry and its synergy with society and the development strat-
egy: "in the event of a war, we wil1 have to have the national mobilization 
feasible under the best conditions, including the economic aspect" (Monteiro 
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1932). Here we can identify a foundation of the current Brazilian National 
Mobilization System (SINAMOB), established by Law II,631/2007 and reg-
ularized by Decree 6,592/2008. Góes Monteiro strongly emphasized the 
preparation and formation of a broad reserve and a Defense Industrial Base: 
It should not be ignored the question of preparation, training and employ-
ment of reserves and supplementary frameworks, by the education and sys-
tematic instruction of the population, and by the eventual use of industries 
applied to war (Monteiro 1932). 
Thus, the Getulio Vargas govemment from 1930 on would have as 
one of the axis the search for military modemization and the constitution of 
a defense industrial base allied to the development strategy. Simultaneously 
with the Pan American Conferences, in the late 1930s, the Brazilian Foreign 
Policy began to seek economic and military advantages through bilateral ne-
gotiations with the United States. The inauguration of Oswaldo Aranha as 
Foreign Minister in March 1938 was one of the milestones of this approach, 
as was his visit to the United States in the following year, known as the "Ara-
nha Mission". The agenda of the meeting between the ministers revealed the 
US intention to establish partnerships with Brazil induding the military issue 
(Carvalho 2014). 
In relation to military cooperation, meetings were held between the 
Chiefs ofStaff ofthe US Armed Forces (George C. Marshall) and Brazil (Góes 
Monteiro) in May 1939. The "Mission Góes", in this sense, was essential for 
the advancement of negotiations that would lead to the construction of US 
bases in northeastem Brazil in exchange for US assistance in retrofitting the 
Brazilian Armed Forces, hitherto largely supplied by Germany. The demands 
for military equipment induded "156 pieces of heavy artillery, 196 anti-air-
craft guns, 41 combat vehides, 252 armored vehides and 722 automatic weap-
ons" (Mccann 1995 apud Carvalho 2014). 
In September 1939, simultaneously with the declaration of Brazilian 
neutrality before the World War 11, the US Congress passed the law sent by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt that allowed the country to seU arms to allies 
(Carvalho 2014). In the midst of the German advance on French territory, 
Vargas gave speeches indicating a possible maintenance of Brazilian neutral-
ity and trade relations with Germanyr2o (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Brazil had a 
strategic position in the Atlanti.c defense system: the United States wanted to 
operate in North Africa from bases in northeastem Brazil, which was seen by 
12 Germany surpassed the US in exports to Brazil in 1936, 1937 and 1938, accounting for up 
to 25% ofBrazilian imports, while US participation fell from 30% to 24% in this period (Cervo 
and Bueno 2010). 
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Vargas as an opportunity to bargain the financing of the steel industry and the 
equipping ofthe anned forces (Cervo and Bueno 2010). 
After the declarations ofthe Brazilian president, the United States was 
prepared to finance the Volta Redonda Power Plant and the National Steel 
Company (NSC) projects, the first steps of the 2nd Industrial Revolution in 
Brazil, the reequipment of its Armed Forces and the origin of the Defense 
Industrial Base (Cervo and Bueno 20!0). The agreement was signed on Sep-
tember 26, 1940 and involved a $20 million loan from the US Export-Import 
Bank (Carvalho 2014). 
After World War 11, the US took the lead in the international economy, 
consolidating the Bretton Woods system, the World Bank and the Intema-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and being responsible for rebuilding Westem 
Europe (to contain the Soviet Union) and Japan (in front ofthe Chinese Rev-
olution of 1949). Dueto the abundance of foreign capital in the context of the 
Cold War, several regions became centers of national development based on 
monopoly enterprises with the contribution of the state and the mediation 
of the working classes (Costa 2oo8). The Third World sought to carry out 
its 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on steel metallurgy, petroleum and elec-
tricity (Visentini 2003) Brazil became the preferred US ally in South Amer-
ica, which would lead to Brazilian adhesion to the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciproca! Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the Organization of American States 
(OAS), created in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Strategic alignment would be 
translated into the 1952 US-Brazil Military Agreement, signed in the context 
ofthe Korean War (1950-1953). 
However, in the 1950s the South Atlantic gradually lost strategic val-
ue compared to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, which directly af-
fected Brazil's bargaining capacity compared to that ofthe 1930s. According 
to Penha (2on) and Luis (2013), the danger of a confrontation between the 
superpowers in the South Atlantic became unlikely, and the main points of 
passage and bottleneck were already controlled by the Westem powers, result-
ing in a worsening of the situation of marginalization o f the South American 
region in relation to politics world. 
In this sense, the Developmental State1l begin to demanda foreign 
policy favorable to the protectionism of the national industry in negotiating 
13 In the context offoreign policy, Cervo (2003) defines the following objectives ofthe develop-
mental state: "a) to introduce economic diplomacy in foreign negotiations; b) to promote indus-
try in order to meet the demands of society; c) to move from subservience to decision-making 
autonomy in order to achieve reciprocal gains in international relations; d) to implement a 
national assertive development project to overcome inequalities between nations; e) to cement 
the whole by economic nationalism, imitating the conduct of the great powers ". 
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forums such as the GATI and UNCTAD and the defense of a differential 
treatment to developing countries (Third World) regarding trade rules (Ol-
iveira M. F. 2005). At the regional levei, it was sought to open markets for 
the promotion of exports of goods and services in Latin America, as well as 
the opening of new lines of credit for the purchase of Brazilian products and 
technical and economic cooperation with Third World countries, especially in 
Africa (Soares de Lima and Santos 2001 apud Oliveira M.F. 2005). 
In this context, the second Vargas govemment (1951-1954) reaffirmed 
the national developmentalist project. Thus, it became necessary to expand 
the industrial and defense infrastructure capacities: the National Bank ofEco-
nomic Development (BNDE, future BNDES) was created in 1952 and the Bra-
zilian Oil Company (Petrobras) in 1953. This project would be continued by 
the Plan of Goals (Planos de Metas, in portuguese) of Juscelino Kubitschek 
(1956-1961) and subsequent development plans in the military regime. Bra-
zil, in this context, could not only think of a process ofimport substitution, in-
itiated in Getulio Vargas' first govemment (1930-1945), but also of expanding 
markets and partnerships. Also, since then, the Brazilian state had realized 
that its alliance with the U S was not yielding the previously expected benefits, 
and transfers of military equipment to Brazil no longer met its real needs 
(Amaral 2013). 
In the military scene, it is possible to emphasize the acquisition in 
1957 ofthe Aerodrome Ship (NAe) Minas Gerais (A-11), ofBritish origin. The 
naval acquisitions during this period demonstrate an important step in the 
diversification ofinternational partnerships14 to be carried out by Brazil in the 
following decades. In addition, the purchase ofNAe Minas Gerais constituted 
a major innovation in the strength pro:file of the Brazilian Navy, since it ai.med 
to enable the country to carry out air support missionsr5 (Amaral 2013). 
From the govemment of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) onwards 
and with continuity in the 196os and 1970s, Brazil recognized the need to 
expand the foreign market to increase exports, attract foreign capital, and in-
crease dollar reserves for the importation of machinery and equipment. In 
14 Acoording to Vidigal (rg85), "the enormous difficulties created by the Americans to supply 
upgraded ships and sophisticated equipment were the main cause of this change of orienta· 
tion." 
rs Here, it is worth mentioning the differences between the Navy and the Air Force over re· 
sponsibilities for naval aviation, which was intensified with the acquisition of A·rr Minas Ge· 
rais. Such an impasse would be solved only in January rg65, when it was established that the 
FAB (Brazilian Air Force) would be responsible for the anti-submarine war, while the Navy 
oould have helicopters for any purpose "(Vidigal rg85). The solution adopted did not entirely 
please both parties, but allowed that "the aerodrome ship oould operate normally since then, 
with FAB planes and Brazilian Navy helicopters" (Vidigal rg85). 
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terms of foreign policy, there was a need for agreements to support national 
companies, such as the Pan-American Operation in 1958 and the Latin Amer-
ican Free Trade Association (IAFTA) in 1960 (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Com-
panies previously focused on the domestic market started to export goods and 
services and even carry out externai investments: Petrobras, Vale do Rio Doce, 
WEG, Embraer and Sadia are some examples. In relation to shipbuilding, 
for example, with the 1st and 2nd National Development Plan (NDP), Brazil 
carne to occupy the second position in the world scene, and employed in this 
sector about 39,000 workers (Moura 2008). 
The defense industry was an essential sector for the Developmental 
State and its Foreign Policy guidelines. Examples include the creation ofEng-
esa Specialized Engineers SA (1958) for the production of tanks and fighting 
vehicle, AVI BRÁS Aerospace SA (1961) for the production of rockets and mis-
siles, and EMBRAER (1969) in the segment of aviation. In 1970 the Rio de Ja-
neiro Navy Arsenal (AMRJ) was granted a license from Great Britain (Vosper 
Thomycroft shipyard) for the production of the Niterói class frigates (project 
Vosper Mk1o). In addition, the country acquired Mirage Ill supersonic fight-
ers from the French company Dassault, and Engesa began production of re-
connaissance armored vehicles (EE-9 Cascavel) and transport (EE-n Urutu). 
In 1971, under the license of the Italian company Aermacchi, Embraer started 
production of Xavante jet training aircraft, and in 1972 the first Integrated 
Center for Air Defense and Air Traffic Control (CINDACTA I) was deployed 
with technology from the French company Thompson -CSF and participation 
ofthe Brazilian company Esca Engineering. In 1973, Brazil acquired F-5 Tiger 
11 supersonic fighters from the Northrop company, and in 1975 the Brazilian 
War Equipment Industry (IMBEL) was created (Abdi 2011). 
Even within the context of the Carter Doctrine (1978), the New Cold 
War with the Govemment ofRonald Reagan (1981-1989) in the USA, and the 
Falldands War (1982), Brazil maintained investments in its defense industry 
until the middle of the 198os. In 1978, H E LIBRAS was created (for making 
helicopters), and Embraer began production of the Tucano turboprop air-
planes basic training. In 1979 the Navy's Nuclear Program was initiated and, 
two years later, the development and local production by the AMRJ of the In-
haúma class corvettes, with technical support from the German shipyard Ma-
rine Technik. In 1981 Embraer, together with the Italian companies Aeritalia 
and Aermacchi, began the development of AMX subsonic fighters; a year lat-
er was created the Engineering ofNaval Projects (ENGEPRON), responsible 
for naval military orders, and in 1982 CINDACTA 11 was also implemented. 
In 1983 A vibras began production of the Astros 11 saturation rocket artillery 
system; two years later, the AMRJ began production ofthe Tupi-class subma-
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rines, under license from the German shipyard HDW (Abdi 2011). 
According to Sennes (2003), the international partnerships described, 
particularly in the governments of Geisel (1974-1978) and Figueiredo (1979-
1985), are based on the principie of diversification of international partner-
ships: (r} the approachment with European countries (Germany, France and 
England) and with Japan, to bargain with the United States of America (USA), 
but without break:ing with the "Westem System", and (2) increasing econom-
ic and political relations with Latin American, African and the Middle East-
em countries, mainly from exports of industrialized products (Sennes 2003). 
However, in the transition from the 198os to the 1990s, this process would be 
interrupted with the rise ofthe NormaljNeoliberal State and the internai and 
externai economic crisis. 
The crisis of the Developmentalist State and the advent of the 
Normal/Neoliberal State [1980-1996] 
The economic crisis of the 198os - interest rate shock, oil crises, rising 
inflation and rising externai debt- led to the retraction of Brazil's national 
developmental model and foreign policy. According to Halliday (1989), there 
was a sharpening of the Cold War from the beginning of the Reagan adminis-
tration in the United States. This is demonstrated by several indicators: first, 
the increase in military expenditures for the modernization of the Armed 
Forces, mainly directed towards employment in the Third World; in addition, 
there was a strong concentration on the production of strategic nuclear mis-
siles, which intensified strategic competition with the Soviet Union (Halli-
day 1989). The second characteristic was the Third World offensive, i.e. the 
1982 Lebanon War, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and support for paramili-
tary groups in four countries: Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia 
(Halliday 1989). This political-m.ilitary offensive was accompanied by an eco-
nomic offensive: raising interest rates on internationalloans and intensifying 
the US subsidy and trade protection policy (Sennes 2003). Emerging coun-
tries - especially those with greater externai debt- were the most affected in 
the process, which put them on the diplomatic defensive. 
In the case of Brazil, as a reaction to the "New Cold War", the historie 
relationship of enmity and competition with Argentina would come to an 
end in the early 198os. Visentini (2013) states that the Falklands War and the 
international interest rate shock impacted directly on the Brazilian perception 
o f the new conjuncture: 
the way Argentina's defeat and implosion of its military regime were artic-
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ulated and executed reinforced the percepti.on of the Brazilian govemment 
and diplomacy that a strongly negative rearticulation of the intemational 
system was being carried out hanning the autonomy of the middle-sized 
countries ofthe Third World (Visentini 2013). 
In 1988, the Federal Constitution consolidated the fundamental ob-
jectives of Brazilian Foreign Policy, strictly related to Defense Policy and the 
Development Model: (r) sovereignty (article r, subsection I), (2) citizenship 
(article r, subsection 11), and (3) regional integration (sole paragraph of Article 
4)16• Sovereignty is the guarantee ofthe security ofthe country in the Intema-
tional System, and its defense is carried out, ultimately, by the Armed Forces. 
The second foundation, citizenship, aims to ensure the population's access to 
social, political and economic rights. Finally, the sole paragraph of article 4 of 
the Federal Constitution established regional integration as a permanent ob-
jective ofthe Brazilian Foreign Policy, and whose current base is the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR)I7. In 1985, at the same time, that Brazil 
endured US retaliation due to its National Informatics Policy, a commission 
was established to study the integration between Brazil and Argentina, which 
culminated in 1991 in the creation ofMercosur. 
However, the integration was shaped by a new matrix of Brazil's for-
eign policy, conditioned in a moment of "triumph" of neoliberalism: "the 
Brasília-Buenos Aires axis of the r98os, with a relatively autonomist and 
developmentalist bias, gained neoliberal colorations" (Visentini 2013). The 
16 Since the beginning ofthe 2oth century, Brazil has sought to secure peace in South America 
through the means of security cooperation, economic integration and diplomacy. An example 
was the "Treaty of cordial political intelligence and arbitration between the United States of 
Brazil, the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic" in 1909, which gave rise to the ABC 
Pact of I9I5 (Heinsfeld 2009). Other initiatives followed: the 1958 Pan American Operation, 
the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LA FI' A) in r960, the Amazon Coop-
eration Treaty Organization (ACTO) in 1978, the Latin American Integration in Latin America 
(ALADI) in 1980, and the negotiations in the 198os for the signing ofMercosur in 1991. These 
inítiatives institutionalized a type of collective hegemony in South America, which is associated 
with the concept of hegemony, in which both coercion and the conviction - mediated by the 
means of payment - play a stabilizing role in the state and therefore also at the continental levei 
(Arrighi 1996). 
17 "lhe Union of South American Nations aims to build, in a participatory and consensual 
manner, a space of integration and union in the cultural, social, economic and política! context 
arnong its peoples, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastruc-
ture, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socio-econornic 
inequality, achieving social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthening democracy and 
reducing asymmetries in the mark of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of 
states •(unasur 2oo8). 
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new foreign policy'8 matrix, based on neoliberal economic policy, replaced 
"autonomy by distance" with "autonomy for integration". According to this 
strategy, the country should integrate itself into the global economy, solving 
its development problems through "active adherence to the development of 
norms and guidelines for the conduct of world order management" (Oliveira 
M.F. 2005). 
Though, the internai demands for foreign policy varied: the agricultur-
a} sector advocated the liberalization ofintemational markets and the opening 
of new ones; the industrial sector if, on the one hand, demanded support for 
its insertion in markets such as Mercosur, South America, Africa and Arab 
countries, on the other hand, wanted to protect itself from the competition 
from producers such as China, the United States and the European Union, 
besides being against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The finan-
ciai sector (banks and rentiers) demanded alignment with the guidelines of 
the international financiai system, strict monetary and fiscal policies regard-
ing the payment of domestic and foreign public debt. According to Oliveira 
M.F. (2005), it can be affirmed that the Brazilian foreign policy in the Fernan-
do Henrique Cardoso (FHC) govemments, to a great extent, corresponded to 
the demands of the financiai sector, mainly since the Real Plan. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, both the international and the 
Brazilian situation had been modified, and the strategy of autonomy by inte-
gration (neoliberal) fragilities have become explicit. In 1999 there was a fi-
nanciai crisis in the country, caused by the abandonment of the exchange rate 
anchor and consequent devaluation of the Real. This demonstrated the exter-
nai vulnerability of the Brazilian economy, leading President FHC to adopt 
a diplomatic stance criticai to asymmetric globalization (Silva 2010). Added 
to this were the failure of the wro meeting in Seattle, the UN drainage and 
US unilateralism, the securitization of the intemational agenda post-n Sep-
tember 2001 and the successive financiai crises and volatility, as well as the 
economic protectionism (Silva 2oro). On the other hand, the devaluation of 
the real increased the competitiveness of Brazilian products, and there was a 
productive restructuring in severa! sectors, which increased the productivity 
of companies as well as the modemization ofthe export-oriented agricultura! 
sector (Oliveira M. F. 2005). 
18 The main guidelines of this agenda were the liberalization of imports, the deregulation of 
capital markets, and privatizations (Oliveira M. F . .2005). This consensus was consolidated 
following the election of Collor in the 1989 elections, and also had as instruments the attrac-
tion of foreign capital, externai financing, the end of subsidies, adoption of new legi.slation on 
intellectual property and the renegotiation of externai debt (Oliveira MF .2005). 
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State Reform, Logistical Paradigm and the construction of the 
National Defense Policy ( 1996-20 13) 
The 1990s corresponded to the crisis of the paradigm of the normal 
state'9 and to the test of the logistic state in Brazilian Foreign Policy (Cervo 
2003). While the normal state refers to the strategy previously designated as 
a quest for autonomy through integration into the rules of the international 
system, the logistic state paradigm may be related to the quest for autonomy 
through assertiveness: 
the reinforcement of the national hard core presupposes, in the logistic 
pattern, the transfer of responsibilities from the business state to society. 
However, it does not disli.ke the state enterprise, although it elevates its 
performance to the levei of global systemic competitiveness. But its focus 
is precisely on providing logistical support to enterprises, public or private, 
preferably private, in order to strengthen it in international comparative 
terms ( ... ) protecting companies, technology and national capital, stimulat-
ing their internai strengthening and its global expansion, taking care ofthe 
work and the good salary of the workers, increasing the well-being of the 
consumer (Cervo 2003, emphasis added). 
The origin of the logistic paradigm is related to the Management Re-
form ofthe Brazilian Public Administration, which began in the mid-1990s. 
U nder the leadership ofLuiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, the guideline for this doc-
ument was the Master Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus (PDRAE), 
formulated in 1995 within the Ministry of Adrninistration and State Reform 
(MARE). The PDRAE's main objective was to modernize the Brazilian bu-
reaucratic apparatus based on the principies of managerialism based on effi-
ciency, effectiveness and the quality ofpublic services (Bresser-Pereira 1995). 
As a result, the Constitutional Amendment No. 19 (1998) was enacted, which 
established the associated management of public services through public con-
sortia•o and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of 
the Federal Constitution). 
On the economic front, the State Reform would be accompanied by the 
19 According to Cervo (:z.ooJ), the paradigm of the normal state is characterized by: submission 
to the hegemonic center of capitalism, dissolution and alienation of the central core of the na-
tional economy, as well as transferring income abroad. 
20 To date, consortia are mostly used by municipalities (in the area ofhealthcare) and by the 
Federal Government (for security at large events), but can also serve as instruments for the 
country to optimize resources, infrastructure and personnel of the states and municipalities 
with a view to leveraging productive investments and generating employm.ent and income (in-
frastructure and defense industry). 
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adoption of the New Macroeconomic Consensus, characterized by inflation 
targets, floating exchange rates and public fiscal surpluses (Resende 2oro). 
The reason for this lies in the fact that the implementation of the PDRAE 
occurred in a context of reaction of the Brazilian State to the internai and ex-
ternai economic crisis that began in the r98os: oil crises, high inflation and 
unemployment, low economic growth, significant externai debt growth, and 
the intensification of protectionism in developed countries (Sennes 2003). 
According to the preamble itself, "state reform has become an indispensa-
ble instrument to consolidate stabilization and ensure sustained economic 
growth" (Brazil r995). 
In this sense, in arder to reduce costs and increase its capacity to carry 
out public policies aimed at serving the citizen, the document proposed a new 
vision about the structure and functions of the state, based on four leveis: 
(r) the Strategic Nucleus, (2) the Exclusive Activities, (3) the Non-Exclusive 
Services, and (4) the production for the market (Brazil r995). The Strategic 
Nucleus and the Exclusive Activities would remain under state contrai; pro-
duction for the market would be left to the private sector, and Non-Exclusive 
Services, such as universities, hospitais, research centers, museums, among 
others, would be part of a third type of public property: the Non-State Public 
Sphere. 
Thus, from the principies of efficiency, professionalization of public 
management and competitiveness, the State Reform sought to "transform so-
cial and scientific services provided by the state into social organizations, that 
is, non-state public organizations financed and supervised by management 
contracts" (Bresser-Pereira 2oor). In addition to Law No. 8.666fr993· which 
is responsible for bidding, the main instruments for conducting, implement-
ing and supervising these contracts would be the Regulatory Agencies"r, Exec-
utive Agencies (public autarchies and foundations), public companies and So-
cial Organizations. In addition, priority would be given to the strategic careers 
ofthe state, which comprised the Strategic Nucleus (Bresser-Pereira r998). 
In the context of foreign policy, in the late 1990s and early 2ooos a 
new intemational insertion matrix was implemented, (r) deepening regional 
integration (with a change of focus), (2) resumption of the multilateral tradi-
tion, (3) a new criticai profile of asymmetric relations between states, (4) the 
pursuit of strategic partnerships with similar countries on ali continents, and 
(5) a rapprochement with underdeveloped countries, and (6) maintaining re-
lationships with developed countries (Silva 20!0). The Brazilian govemment 
opted for the creation of diversified political and economic partnerships, such 
21 Examples: National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and National Telecommunications Agency 
(ANATEL). 
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as the one with China, which in 2002 already ranked second as Brazil's trad-
ing partner, as well as India, Russia and South Africa (Oliveira M. F. 2005). 
The transition from the strategy of autonomy through integration to "auton-
omy through assertiveness" had already begun in the 2nd FHC government, 
but will be consolidated in the Lula Government, starting in 2002. 
I tis in this context o f reorganization in the International System - with 
the end ofthe Cold War- and in the Brazil's foreign policy- the advent ofthe 
Logistics State - that there was a progressive resumption of defense and secu-
rity affairs in Brazil, a process that was reflected in the creation o f the Ministry 
of Defense in 1999 and the promulgation of the National Defense Strategy 
in 2008. As will be seen below, this is not only a momentary impulse, but 
the recognition that military capabilities are a prerequisite for the country's 
strategic autonomy in the International System and for the consolidation of 
its development model. In this way, Brazil seeks to combine its security train-
ing with the formation of a robust national economy capable of dealing with 
possible externai instabilities, as foreseen in the National Defense Strategy 
(Brazil2oo8b). 
The construction of the National Defense Policy, the National 
Defense Strategy and the National Defense White Paper 
(1996-2012) 
During the 1990s, there was a relative dismantling of the operational 
capabilities ofthe Brazilian Armed Forces, resulting from the sharp decline in 
the defense budget (Abdi 2013). However, in 1996, with the publication of the 
National Defense Policy (NDP), the Brazilian state recognized the need to "set 
the objectives for the defense of the nation, as well as a guide for the prepara-
tion and use of national training in alllevels and spheres of power, and with 
the involvement of the civil and military sectors "(Brazil 1996). Despite the re-
cent end of the Cold War, an "indefinite and unstable multipolar international 
environment" was identified because of the "lack of correspondence between 
strategic-military, political and economic power centers" (Brazil 1996). 
Thus, in arder to deal with the new intemational situation, Comple-
mentary Law 97 was approved, which "provides for the general norms for 
the organization, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces" (Brazil, 
1999). One of the main achievements of CL No. 97 was the creation of the 
Ministry of Defense, as a result of the perception that civil society must be an 
active part of the strategy to defend the country's sovereignty. The authority of 
the Minister of Defense as part of the Executive Branch was included in the 
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Federal Constitution by Constitutional Amendment No. 2 3 o f the same year. 
I t was in this context that the purchase of the new Brazilian aircraft carrier, 
A-12 São Paulo (32,000 tons), belonging to France and incorporated into the 
Brazilian Navy in 2001, took place. 
Considering the Ministry of Defense, the fundamental principies of 
the Constitution began to gain force oflaw and institutional structure. I tem li 
of article 14 of CL No. 97 relates the guarantee of state sovereignty to the socio-
econornic developrnent of the country: "The preparation of the Arrned Forces 
is guided by the following basic parameters: ( ... ) II - search for increasing 
national autonorny by rneans of continuous nationalization of its resources, 
including research and developrnent and the strengthening of the national 
industry"' (Brazil 1999). Likewise, Article 16 states that "it is for the Arrned 
Forces, as a general subsidiary assignrnent, to cooperate with national devel-
oprnent and civil defense"' (Brazil 1999). 
The use of the Armed Forces to safeguard sovereignty and citizenship 
is a prerequisite for nationallogistics. Clausewitz theoretically separates the 
use of force, on the one hand, frorn the preconditions to conducting the war 
itself, that is, logistics. Logistics refers to the creation, rnovernent and rnainte-
nance of forces in combat: "all warfare activities that are preconditions for the 
use of the fighting forces" (Proença Júnior and Duarte 2005). Brazil initiated 
this formulation in its doctrinal and legislative systern with Cornplernentary 
Law No.117 in 2004, and with the creation ofthe National Mobilization Sys-
tem (SINAMOB)"2 by Law No. n.631, ofDecember 27, 2007. 
The LC No.n7 (2004) included in article 13 of LC No. 97 (1999) a 
specific paragraph that relates the logistics and the national rnobilization in 
Brazil: 
the preparation [of the Armed Forces] includes, among others, the perma-
nent activities of planning, organization and articulation, education and 
training, development of doctrine and specific research, intelligence and 
structuring of the Armed Forces, their logistics and mobilization (Brazil 
2.004)· 
Likewise, both CL No. 97 (1999) and CL No. n7 (2004) reaffirmed the 
role ofthe Arrned Forces in the forrnation ofthe DIB. In 2007, through Law 
No. n.631, the National Mobilization Systern (SINAMOB) was irnplernented, 
which airns to carry out "the set of activities planned, oriented and undertaken 
by the state, complementing the National Logistics, designed to enable the 
country to carry out strategic actions, in the field of National Defense, in the 
face of foreign aggression" (Brazil 2007). 
22 SINAMOB was subsequently regulated by Decree No. 6.592, of 2008. 
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In 2005, the National Defense Policy (NDP, Decree No. 5·484/2005) 
was approved, with three rnain points: (1) the need for restructuring and reor-
ganization ofthe Armed Forces; (2) the search for synergy between defense 
policy and Brazil's socioeconomic development project; (3) South America 
and the South Atlantic as priority regions for the country's security" (Brazil 
2005). The NDP "is based on the foundations, objectives and principies set 
forth in the Federal Consti.tution and is in line with the Government's guide-
lines and foreign policy" (Brazil2oos). 
The vision ofthe insecurity ofthe International System was highlight-
ed: "In this century, disputes over maritime areas, the aerospace domain, and 
increasingly scarce sources of fresh water and energy may intensify. Such is-
sues may lead to interferences in internai affairs, configuring conflict frame-
works" (Brazil2oos). In this way, the document recognizes the importance 
ofSouth America and the South Atlantic as strategic priorities ofBrazil's For-
eign and Security Policy: 
Among the processes that contribute to reduce the possibility of conflicts 
in the strategic environment, we highlight the strengthening o f the integra-
tion process, based on Mercosur, the Andean Community of Nations and 
the South American Community ofNations; the dose relationship between 
the Amazonian countries, within the framework of the Amazon Coopera-
tion Treaty Organization; intensified cooperation and trade with African 
countries facilitated by ethnic and cultural ties; and the consolidation of the 
South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. The expansion and modemi-
zation ofSouth America's infrastructure can make the connection between 
its productive centers and the two oceans easier, facilitating development 
and integration. ( ... ) prioritizes the Amazon and the South Atlantic for the 
wealth of resources and vulnerability of access by land and sea borders (Bra-
zil2oos). 
On the other hand, since the 1990s, Brazil has realized the need for 
advanced defense from South America and the South Atlantic, which may in-
fluence events in other regions. In the 1996 NDP, the objective of national de-
fense is described as "the attainment and rnaintenance of Brazilian interests 
abroad, "safeguarding ofBrazilian persons, goods and resources or under Bra-
zilian jurisdiction," and "Brazil's projection in the concert of nations" (Brazil 
1996). More directly, the 2005 NDP aims to "defend national interests and 
people, Brazilian assets and resources abroad" (Brazil2oos). Such a strategy 
would be regulated by Decree No. 6.592/2008, which regulated the National 
Mobilization System (SINAMOB), to be used in cases of foreign aggression. 
In this decree, "foreign aggression" was defined as "threats or acts prejudicial 
to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the Brazilian people or national in-
stituti.ons, even though they do not mean an invasion ofthe national territory" 
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(Brazil, 2oo8a. Emphasis added). 
Similarly, NDS is based on "the foundations, objectives and principies 
set forth in the Federal Constitution" and seeks to fulfill the constitutional ob-
jectives of guaranteeing national development, as well as democratizing the 
market economy and deepening democracy, by organizing economic growth 
socially inclusive (Brazilzoo8b). This is also demonstrated by the restructur-
ing of the Brazilian defense materiais industry, the integration of the indus-
trial defense bases of UNASUR countries, and the search for dual civilian 
and military technologies (BRASIL, zoo8b). The r8th guideline of the NOS 
specifies the integration of South America, under the auspices of UNASUR, 
as one ofits objectives: 
The South American Defense Council, under discussion within the re-
gion, will create a consultative mechanism that will prevent conflicts and 
promote regional military cooperation and the integration of industrial de-
fense bases, without being involved in a country outside the region (Brasil 
2oo8b). 
In this sense, Constitutional Amendment (CA) No. 45 ofDecember 31, 
2004 presented a doctrinal innovation by elevating the treaties and conven-
tions on human rights approved by the National Congress to the character of 
Constitutional Amendments, in addition to submitting Brazil "to Internation-
al Criminal Court jurisdiction, whose creation has expressed its support"(Bra-
zil 2004). In this way, the country prepares its internai juridical framework 
for regional integration, seeking to comply with the sole paragraph of Article 
4 of the Constitution, which deals with the integration of South America, one 
o f the priorities pointed out by the NOS. 
Whereas considering the problem of regional inequalities of defense 
and development, the NDS seeks to emphasize the presence of the state in the 
large ri ver basins of the Amazon and Paraguay-Paraná. With this purpose, the 
NOS had foreseen the elaboration of the Articulation and Equipment Plans, 
in which each Force would present its priority inves1ment demands. The 
Plans aims to "contemplate a proposal for the spatial distribution of military 
installations and the quantification of the means necessary to effectively meet 
the Employment Hypotheses" (Brazil zoo8b). The National Oefense White 
Paper (NDWP), published in 2012, detailed the requirements of the Articu-
lation and Equipment Plans ofthe three forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), 
which can be summarized in Table r below. 
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Defense Policy: Major projects planned or in progress 
Army Astros SISFRON SISDABRA Armored IA2 rifles Cyber 
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Fonte: National Defense White Paper (2012) 
In this sense, in March 2013, the Federal Govemment issued Decree 
No. 7970, which regulated Law 12.598 (2012), establishing "special rules for 
procurement, contracting and development of defense products and systems" 
to "increase the technological and productive capacity of the industrial defense 
base" (Brazil 2013). This law consolidated the search model of partnerships 
between national and foreign companies for the development of so-called De-
fense Products (PRODE)~' and Strategic Defense Products (PED), identified 
as "ali Prode that, dueto the technological content, the difficulty of obtaining 
or for its indispensability, is of strategic interest for national defense" (Brazil 
20r2a). For example, the use of naval missiles by the Anny, Navy and Air 
Force is a viable altemative in the short term, with less significant financiai 
costs and capable of generating a technological spillover in the country's econ-
omy (Brites, Martins and Silva 2013). 
To sum up, the National Defense Policy (1996, 2005 and 2012), the 
NDS (2oo8) and the White Paper on National Defense (2012) cover the three 
spheres of war: Strategy (political objectives of military preparation), Oper-
ations (hypothesis of advanced defense employment) and tactics (weapons 
systems). In this sense, it had defined that the Executive Branch will forward 
to the National Congress every four years these three documents with their 
updates. In 2013, the three were approved in the National Congress by Leg-
islative Decree No. 373· In 2017, the Presidency forwarded to the Legislature 
the updating ofthe NDP, the NDS and the NDWP, whose changes are related 
23 Defense Product (PRODE) is •any good, service, work ar infonnation, including arrna-
ments, ammunition, means of transportation and communications, uniforms and materiais 
for individual and collective use used in defense finalist activities, with the exception of those 
for administrative use •. 
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to the changes in the Externai Policy and in the model of development post-
2012. 
The Update of the Brazilian Defense Documents in a Context 
o f Economic Retraction (20 12-20 17) 
Since the international financiai crisis of 2007/2oo8, the internai and 
externai political and economic situation has deteriorated. In Brazil, the be-
ginning of oil exploration in the pre-sait layer (2010) followed the upsurge 
in the economic and military competition of the great powers, and the devel-
opment model hitherto adopted began to show limits, reflected in the fali in 
GDP growth in the Brazil from 2.7% in 2011 to 0.9% in 2012. lhe internai 
political crisis from 2013 onwards, with the start of protests against corrup-
tion and the launching of Operation "Car-Wash" (Lava-Jato in Portuguese) 
in 2014, which would disorganize the bases ofthe Dilma Rousseff's govern-
ment, led to the impeachment in 2016. 
Simultaneously, as of 2011, the Strategic Defense Planning System 
(SISPED) was structured to systematize the updating ofBrazil's defense doc-
uments (Brazil 2012). lhis procedure for reviewing the documents is pro-
vided for in the Supplementary Law 97/1999 (article 9, paragraph 3) within 
a four-year interval, when the Executive Branch (Presidency of the Republic 
and Ministries) forward the new version for consideration of the National 
Congress. However, even with SISPED is in its initial phase, the updating of 
the documents in 2016 showed a relative lack of commonality in some areas, 
such as the diagnosis of the current economic situation of the country, which 
is presented as stable, and the contradiction between the belief in internai 
investments (without budget basis) and intemational technical cooperation 
as solutions to the DIB's stagnation. 
lhe preliminary version ofthe 2016j2017 documents provided clear 
elements of the continuity of the Brazilian Defense Policy, such as the prior-
itization of the strategic environment (South America, South Atlantic, West 
African coast and Antarctica), the importance of the relationship between 
defense and economic development, particularly through dual-use technol-
ogies, the pursuit of the aerospace and cyber environment, the expansion of 
the energy matrix and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. On the 
other hand, there are some changes and absences in the documents that draw 
attention, especially in relation to the diagnosis of the current international 
situation (multipolarity), the view on the characteristics of war in the 21st cen-
tury (the concept of Hybrid Warfare), and the budget forecast for the major 
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strategic projects ofthe National Defense Strategy, which is related to both the 
internai economic recession and the lack of stability of defense investments 
by the Executive Branch. 
In the military sphere, it can be observed that, despite the legislative 
and investment advances to boost the DIB, there is still a great distance be-
tween Brazilian military capabilities and that of the great powers of the Inter-
national System, as shown in Table 2 below, which compares the naval power 
of ten countries. Naval military capabilities are an important indicator of the 
polarity of an Intemational System, especially if we assume that a great power 
must be able to influence events beyond its own region (Buzan and Waever 
2003)· 
Table 2 -Submarines, Surface Media and Amphibious Ships [2016) 
ENG FRA ITA USA RUS JAP COR CHI IND BRA 
SUB 10 10 6 71 63 18 23 61 14 5 
SUP 19 23 19 98 35* 47 59 74** 28*** 14 
ANF 3 3 4 30 19 3 2 3 1 1 
5ource: lnternationallnstitute for Strategic Studies [1155 2016]. 
* + 46 corvettes capable of launching anti-ship and I or anti-aircraft missiles. 
** + 115 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and I o r anti-aircraft 
missiles. 
*** + 24 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and I o r anti-aircraft 
missiles. 
In this way, both the NDP and the NOS and the White Paper of 
2016j2017 maintained the Brazilian military preparation based on capabil-
ities and not on specific employment scenarios, in order to overcome the ex-
isting asymmetries. Tiris is the reason why the strategic projects of the three 
Forces (PAEDs), which have not undergone significant changes, are impor-
tant. One difference is that the outline of the new NDWP does not indicate a 
long-term budgetary forecast for its implementation (which occurred in the 
2012 document). Nevertheless, one can observe the maintenance of the stra-
tegic projects, such as the beginning of the process of conclusion of the con-
ventional submarines of the Riachuelo Class (Ports and Ships 2018). 
In addition to the conceptual changes, another major inflection in Bra-
zil' s Defense Policy seems to be related to the Foreign Policy. After reaffirming 
the prioritization of South American integration and the strategic environ-
ment, the NDP refers to North America and Europe as traditional relations 
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that constitute areas ofinterest to the country. At the same time, no document 
mentions the BRICS, which was part ofthe 2012 NOS. However, the question 
remains: the relative downgrading of the BRICS and South-South relations -
which is contradictory in itself, since the country depends economically on 
these regions - will necessarily allow Brazil to achieve a higher relevance in 
relations with the US and European countries? Twentieth-century experience 
indicates that this never occurred unless Brazil became strategically impor-
tant to the United States in World War 11, and Getúlio Vargas knew how to 
seize the opportunity to bargain for the financing of industrialization in the 
1930s and 1940s. 
In fact, the adoption of a supporting role in the major world decisions 
derives from the absence of an externai policy strategy that makes the country 
important for other major powers. The recent attempt by the Michel Tem-
er-José Serra alliance to build a "New Foreign Policy" meant only a political 
change at the regional levei to isolate Venezuela, the abandonment of multi-
lateralism (apparently rescued by the current management of Aloysio Nunes 
in the Ministry ofForeign Affairs), and frustrated attempt to boost the Merco-
sur-European Free Trade Union Agreement. 
Finally, we can highlight the sustainability of the OIB, a challenge that 
is already present in the current Brazilian defense documents, but which re-
sponse was adjusted in synergy with changes in foreign policy. The new NOP 
seeks cooperation with the most technologically advanced nations in synergy 
with national projects but aims for a low budgetary impact and positive de-
velopments for the national economy, such as through exports. On the other 
hand, in a contradictory manner, the new NOS affirms that "the state must 
use its purchasing power to ensure minimum conditions for sustainability 
and to improve the OIB's capacities, so that the production chain is relatively 
independent of the policy of export and marketing of dual products" (Brazil 
2016). 
Oespite this particular contradiction, a positive aspect is the Armed 
Forces' quest to boost joint research and development (R&O) in areas of com-
mon interest. There is at this point an opening for new legal forms for the 
management o f these projects, which opens space for the interaction between 
the civil and military sector, involving state enterprises, non-state public or-
ganizations and private institutions. Joint research between Army, Navy and 
Aeronautics can yield good results, such as those obtained, for example, in the 
development ofTomahawk and Harpoon missile cruisers in the US (Werrell 
1985)· 
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Conclusion 
The Brazilian state reacted systematically to changes in the intema-
tional context, seeking new ways to consolidate the principies of its Grand 
Strategy: sovereignty (security), citizenship (development) and regional inte-
gration. lt is important to note that regional integration did not mean the 
abandonment of extra-regional partnerships, but rather strengthened Brazil-
ian bargaining power within the South-North (United States and Europe), 
South-East (Northeast and East Asian), and South-South (Africa, Middle East 
and Southeast Asia) alliances (Visentini 1995). These become essential, espe-
cially ata time of uncertainty and political, economic and military crisis in the 
lntemational System, where tensions are increasing in various parts of the 
world, such as in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, where involved stra-
tegic partners from Brazil such as the United States, China, among others. 
The National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 
the National Defense White Paper were responses by the Brazilian state to the 
political and economic restructuring of the post-Cold War Intemational Sys-
tem in a context of uncertainty as to its polarity, and polarization (alliances). 
NDS synthesized the demands of Brazilian society for the deepening of its 
industrial capacity, technologicallevel, employment and income generation, 
and regional disparities (for example, in the duplication of the navy squadron 
towards the north-northeast region of the country). Thus, it is the assumption 
ofNDS that the guarantee of citizenship is related to the capacity to maintain 
the sovereignty of the Brazilian state, and that the academic, industrial, mil-
itary and govemmental sector are indispensable for the continuity of these 
investrnents. 
In this sense, it is interesting to note that at the same time as the struc-
ture of the Ministry of Defense (1999) and later the National Defense Policy 
(2005) and the National Defense Strategy (2oo8), there was also a great dem-
ocratic consensus backed by a development model based on the increase in 
consumption, the expansion of the state as a service provider and the search 
for an increase in citizenship (Abrucio, Loureiro and Pacheco 2010). Since the 
Lula administration, this model gained a developmentalist framework, main-
ly in relation to the investrnents in infrastructure and in the naval industry 
around the exploration of the Pre-Salt. 
This consensus persisted while externai conditions - economic glo-
balization, high commodity prices and high growth in China- were favora-
ble, but from 2013 onwards this picture has changed dramatically. The resur-
gence of intemational economic, political and military disputes revealed the 
shortcomings of the Brazilian development model adopted (Logistic State), 
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mainly in relation to the sustainability ofinvestments in the DIB, which were 
directly curtailed. The current reassessment o f Brazil' s defense documents 
(NDP, NOS and NDWP) occurs ata time ofuncertainty regarding the coun-
try's internai and externai situation, a challenging scenario for the formula-
tion of the national strategy. Internally, the economic recession and the rise 
in unemploym.ent, which doubled in the last three years to 13.7%, occurred 
simultaneously to a political-institutional crisis. 
At the intemationallevel, Barack Obama' s unwillingness to withdraw 
the US from the Middle East and the subsequent rise ofDonald Trump repre-
sented the retum of the Momoe Doctrine assumptions to US foreign policy. 
In February 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made visits to :five Latin 
American countries and evoked the Monroe Doctrine as one ofhis references 
(Gramer and Johnson 2018). This visit to the continent represents a tuming 
point in US foreign policy for the region, which hitherto was guided by a rei-
ative "diplomatic drift" from the region~4. 
In this context, the Brazilian Foreign Policy is similar to the one o f the 
late 198os and 199os: a new process of economic openness aimed at compen-
sating for the growing public deficit and the absence of a strategy to deal with 
an increasingly hostile intemational environment to the pretensions of the 
country. There are, therefore, two important shortcomings to be met in the 
coming years: the lack of definition of foreign policy, which has been inerad-
icable since Dilrna Rousseff's second govemment, and the lack of a concrete 
response to the problem of the sustainability ofinvestments in the DIB. 
Enabling strategic mobility capabilities - especially in extra-regional 
operations - is incompatible with a development model that wants to cut gov-
emment spending and rely on the domestic market to buy DIB products. Bra-
zil does not only need an effective Defense Policy, but one that it is in synergy 
with the Foreign Policy and a development model that seeks technological 
modemization and productive scale with intemational competitiveness. In-
stitutional creativity to boost military investrnents, the generation of spin-offs 
and dual-use products is foreseen in the new strategic documents, and it is 
incumbent upon policy m.akers to create synergies between Defense, Diplo-
macy and Development. 
As indicators for future work, it is necessary to study the possible ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of the possible instruments of the Logistics State to 
obtain a synergy between the Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and the Model 
24 By 2013, then Secretary of State John Kerry had stated that the hemisphere was no longer 
US-dorninated, accepting the multilateralization of relations in the region, what Khana (2oo8) 
had terrned the •end ofthe Monroe Doctrine" (Johnson 2013). 
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ofDevelopment ofthe country: (r) Hybrid lnstitutional Arrangements ... 5, and 
2) Public-public and public-private consortia as a comerstone of Cooperative 
Federalism and Intemational Technical Cooperation (ITC). One hypothesis to 
be developed is that public-private and public-private consortia could be the 
mainstay of this new model, carrying out Cooperative Federalism and gener-
ating an effective association between state, private sector and third sector for 
development (modemization and scale productive) and jointly with regional 
and extra-regional partners. For the sustainability of this new model of devel-
opment, alliances of variable geometry are essential for obtaining (r) modem-
ization through technology transfer and ITC, and (2) the scale ofproduction 
through the opening of new markets. 
Donald Trump's apparent freezing of major intemational agreements, 
Russia's successes in the Middle East, and the slowing ofChinese growth may 
give Brazil opportunities to enter into strategic and economic agreements 
beneficiai to its DIB. Technical Cooperation will bear fruit only if Brazil ob-
tains good bargaining conditions and institutions (whether public or private) 
are able to absorb the knowledge acquired for the local DIB. Finally, it is im-
portant to emphasize the need for diplomacy and the proactive Executive Pow-
er to open markets to Brazilian defense products, something that can scale to 
national production (ships, missiles, armored vehicles, aircraft, among other 
equipment). The attraction of investment also requires state support to win 
partners, as exemplified in the case of the agreement with the French com-
pany DCNS for the construction of submarines, and with Sweden for the 
acquisition ofthe Gripen NG fighters. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article presents an analysis of the relationship between Brazil's foreign policy, 
defense policy and development model in a historical perspective. A paradigmatic 
approach is used, trying to identify the phases of the Brazilian Grand Strategy that 
cross the limits of the presidential terms, being also linked to intemational political, 
economic and military constraints. lhe period covered begins in the 1930s, with 
the rise of the Developmental State, addresses the 198os tuming point (Normal/ 
Neoliberal State), and examines the defense investment's rise and oisis of the 2ooos 
and 201os (Logistic State). 
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